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Introduction
In the following, I shall merely present a reading of Žižek’s excellent, concentrated 
piece, while proposing some asides to indicate possible alternatives, particularly 
those opened up by a reading of Heidegger which, elsewhere, he himself has 
broached, and which in all respects he has made possible. We might be said to play 
one reading off against the other. Our general hypothesis will be that Heidegger is 
even closer to Žižek than Žižek believes him to be, and yet he reaches a different 
conclusion from the same Žižekian premises. Žižek has from close to the very 
beginning been struggling to define his own relation to Heidegger. The current essay 
ties another knot in an already tangled thread.
On my reading, the kind of ontic revolutionary action which attempts to open 
up a space in the current order for an event of the New is precisely the kind of action 
which Heidegger himself desires. Not, however in his middle period, but in his later. It 
is a consequence of Žižek’s locating the possibility of a promising model of human 
action in the middle Heidegger that allows him to endorse a more humanistically 
inspired action than Heidegger ultimately promotes, and at the same time it allows 
him to understand as political an action which for Heidegger might well be ethical.
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Philosophy against democracy: theory and practice
Žižek’s essay seeks to determine the relation that should exist between theory and 
praxis. As a result of philosophy’s traditional status as anti-democratic, contemporary 
politics, blinded by the ‘democratic consensus’, understands itself to be radically 
distinct from theory (‘ideology’). Philosophy’s systematic, totalising ambitions are 
understood to result in a valorising of totalitarian philosophy, as is exemplified in the 
political engagements of philosophers from Plato to Heidegger (to Foucault). Žižek 
however is seeking an alternative to democracy, and for this very purpose seeks to 
rethink and indeed re-evaluate philosophy’s anti-democratic instinct as a promising 
sign of its possible application to praxis. After all, if we do not concede, as Žižek does 
not, that being anti-democratic is a bad thing, then the possibilities of a philosophical 
politics appear in a new light.
The hegemonic view, which wishes to separate politics from the a guiding 
theoretical insight states that the positing of a politics as an outcome of a theory 
which understands the totality of what is and/or of history as a single process can 
only be anti-democratic: there can only be one single party in possession of the truth 
of history, which understands and responds to ‘the truth of the age’. All others simply 
need to be taught this. Hence, totalitarianism, in contrast to a democratic plurality of 
potentially hegemonic parties and interests. Philosophy as precisely the grand 
narrative of metaphysics, the naming of beings as such and as a whole, has always 
tended in this political direction, believing that any politics could be adequate to their 
ontological and/or historical theorising, only to turn away from politics in aristocratic 
indifference after the inevitable disappointment. It is just this dichotomy, of 
‘ontological politics’ and ‘merely ontic politics’ that Žižek attempts slowly and surely to 
overcome.
Lacan and democracy
Žižek’s dream is an actual realisable philosophical politics. He approaches this 
problem by considering twentieth century philosophy’s most prominent attempts to 
engage actively in politics: Heidegger and Foucault. The benchmark for this 
engagement is that thinker who stands perhaps as a provocation to philosophy itself, 
a moment somewhat other than philosophy at which its truth comes to light and can 
be reflected back to it: Lacan. 
2
Žižek asks how Lacan stands with respect to democracy and adduces three 
alternative conceptions:
1) Democratic.
The notion of the empty signifier renders Lacan the ultimate theorist of democratic 
politics since it represents the necessarily ‘empty place of power’, the non-natural 
and non-permanent occupant of the place of power. If one allows this occupancy to 
be contingent and thus the topic of ‘politics’ (in Laclau’s sense of the contestation for 
hegemony by a plurality of struggling interests), one remains at the most basic level 
‘radically democratic’.
2) Anti-democratic supplement to democracy.
Lacan’s theory is a provocation of democracy: anti-democratic, but in a way that 
supplements democracy in what we can infer is a Derridean sense. The provocative 
opposition is necessary to the very maintenance of democracy as such. Without an 
anti-democratic goad democracy hardens into totalitarian rule. It can present itself to 
itself and understand itself only by reflecting itself in its opposite, an opposite whose 
existence it must allow in order to be democratic. This is akin to the first option, 
except this deconstruction does not propose itself at a politics but rather as a critic of 
politics itself, a critic of ideology, the illusion of the natural permanence of the ruling 
order. This is the traditional Platonic model of the philosopher as opposed to the 
rabble of democracy, Socrates as the gadfly to Athenian democracy. 
On this view, theory remains impotent and presents an ideal which cannot be 
realised politically and ultimately bolsters democracy itself. “a democracy needs a 
permanent influx of anti-democratic self-questioning in order to remain a living 
democracy” (6). Thus the anti-democratic necessity is ‘grounded’ (8) in the need for 
more democracy, which is to say that the place of power be open to ever renewed 
usurpation and hence criticism of its current occupant.  In this perspective of the 
relation between theory and practice, theory deconstructs the appearance of stable 
meaning, which is to say the apparent completeness of any symbolic system, lacking 
any inconsistency or emptiness, while politics pragmatically reasserts such 
significance. However, Žižek indicates that today this relationship has been reversed 
to the extent that it is politics as ‘ideological supplement’ to capitalism that threatens 
meaning.
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Although this goes unsaid in Žižek’s piece, what we should infer from this is 
that deconstructive politics is no good in light of this development, and if democracy 
is complicit with capitalism then the search for an alternative to capitalistic politics will 
not issue from deconstruction. This was Žižek’s point from the very start. If capitalism 
is the threat to meaning, a theoretico-deconstructive opposition to politics which 
would dissolve apparently stable meanings is clearly not necessary or helpful in the 
struggle against capitalism. Indeed it bolsters the impression that capitalist, 
democratic orders wish to present, that they are rational, organised, decent, humane: 
the only form of politics that is viable, here at the end of history.
This is why Žižek proposes a third option, that is neither democratic, nor 
deconstructively anti-democratic. Rather, theory itself must be put into practice 
against democracy, as has long been attempted by Platonic philosophers, but hardly 
ever with any great success.
3) Synthesis.
Hitherto, philosophy has been understood to be either democratic and realisable or 
totalitarian and unrealisable (save in disaster). Žižek’s conclusion is neither an 
ontological politics, in which theory would be adequated by a political democratic 
project (1), nor an impotent and idealistic critique of all politics, which remains always 
a compromise of the ontological incompleteness that theory indicates (2). Rather, 
Žižek is pursuing a theoretical politics that would amount to a livable, achievable 
project of revolutionary action, guided by a theoretical understanding of the nature of 
the social whole.
The question is to find a way in which a theory that is not democratic can be 
put into practice. The trouble is that the two prime examples of non-democratic 
enactment of theory in recent times have veered towards the fascistic, in Heidegger’s 
case and in Foucault’s. And yet, Žižek is keen to seize on the potential that was 
betrayed in the particular way in which these engagements were actualised. By 
means of a juxtaposition of what went wrong in each case, Žižek delineates the 
general contours of this lost potential, thus pointing the way to the future. 
Ultimately, he is seeking not just a non-democratic theoretical politics, but also a non-
Nazistic one. Which is perhaps why he finds it necessary to present Foucault as a 
contrast with Heidegger, for his ‘event’ (the Iranian revolution) was closer to being a 
true event — which is to say the appearance of a genuine alternative to democracy, 
a novelty in contrast to the democratic consensus — than Heidegger’s Nazis. 
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Foucault nevertheless misconstrued the relation between the event itself and its 
problematic aftermath.
The intellectuals’ engagements
In both cases what occurs is an apparent realisation of theory in reality, an actual 
liveable alternative to democracy was seen in an actual political event to which 
support was then given, the Nazi’s conservative revolution and the Iranian revolution. 
Žižek refuses the usual reading of the engagements as demonstrating a limitation of 
their previous position whose becoming-visible precipitated a ‘turn’, and a turn away 
from politics. Even if this was how the thinkers themselves saw it. Once again, as in 
The Ticklish Subject, Žižek retrieves something valuable in the actual engagement 
itself. However, the manner in which this is done here differs.
Here Žižek allows himself a distinction which he did not allow himself before, 
believing it to be a statement characteristic of ideology itself, and one which is all too 
deconstructive, envisioning practice as a ‘fall’ away from the level of theory. The 
distinction is one between form and content, or, more frequently between virtuality 
and its actualisation (these terms have proliferated in Žižek’s discourse since his 
engagement with Deleuze in Organs Without Bodies). This distinction allows him to 
sympathise with Heidegger’s reference to the ‘inner truth and greatness’ of the Nazi 
movement (Introduction to Metaphysics:213/152). The reason why this distinction 
has become acceptable to Žižek is perhaps his growing belief in the Benjaminian 
notion the arising of the new from the lost potentials or ‘Lost Causes’ of the past, 
although this is slightly undercut by the remarkable peroration to For They Know Not 
What They Do, which speaks of the Leftist project as precisely a seizing on the lost 
causes of the past (For They Know Not What They Do:272–3). Thus Žižek can say of 
Heidegger’s engagement, that formally it contained promise, but was mistaken in 
terms of its content.
To nuance this, in the subsequent section on Foucault, Žižek refuses the 
simple opposition of the event and its compromise, on the grounds that this does not 
give us the means to distinguish between true and false Events. Perhaps this is also 
to be applied to Heidegger, who in Žižek (and Badiou’s)’s eyes did indeed mistake an 
event for a pseudo-event, and although Žižek does not say this, perhaps we are to 
infer that his distinction between actuality and virtuality (‘inner greatness’) is rather (at 
least in Heidegger’s case) an attempt to redeem something which should not be 
redeemed, and did not allow him to distinguish true and false events. The question 
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raised by the deconstruction of Foucault is: ‘given we can identify a virtual core that is 
respectable in no matter what actualisation, how are we to avoid the Heideggerian 
mistake of attempting to redeem the irredeemable, a pseudo- or non-event?’
This would seem to be the purpose of Žižek’s section on Foucault, for Žižek 
here asserts that the Iranian revolution, unlike the conservative revolution was indeed 
a true event. The Iranian revolution produced an alternative to liberal democracy that 
did not (have to) regress to pre-modern tradition, it revealed a possible future. Žižek 
therefore does not criticise Foucault’s enthusiasm for the event, but merely the way 
he interpreted it (or rather, interpreted its interpretation): ‘Foucault was right in 
engaging himself, he correctly detected the emancipatory potential in the events’ 
(15). This way leaves one open to an engagement such as Heidegger’s, where 
enthusiasm is placed behind a pseudo-event. ‘This, also, compels us to qualify and 
limit the homology between Foucault’s Iranian engagement and Heidegger’s Nazi 
engagement’ (15).
Foucault distinguishes, in a way that Žižek has come to identify with 
deconstructive politics, between the pure event, the ‘revolt’ and the political interests 
which later come to appropriate and compromise its absoluteness, as if it were a 
pure event of novelty without content which only then was assimilated to intelligible 
interests and the aims of various groups actually existing in Iran at the time. A 
genuine emancipatory outburst followed by a pragmatic compromise. 
Žižek is quite explicit that the problem with this is that it does not let one 
distinguish different modalities of enthusiasm (15), event and pseudo-event. Žižek 
however recognises that, at least at one level, Foucault exceeds this opposition 
between the absolutely novel, virtual event, and its conservative actuality, in the 
following terms: ‘“chauvinism”, “virulent xenophobia”, the socio-political reality, they 
are an inherent support of the Event itself, i.e., their mobilisation gave the Event the 
strength to oppose itself to the oppressive political regime and to avoid getting caught 
in the game of political calculations” (13). Relying on such things ‘gave the Iranian 
revolution the strength to move beyond a mere pragmatic power-struggle’.  It is here 
however that we return to the original problem, that “Event turns into a purely formal 
feature, indifferent towards its specific historical content” (13), and this leads us back 
to the impossibility of distinguishing the Nazi event from a true event, which the 
Iranian revolution was: ‘it was an authentic Event, a momentary opening that 
unleashed unheard-of forces of social transformation’ (14). ‘The Nazi “revolution” was 
never “open” in this authentic sense’ (14).
Žižek wishes to find a politics that would be ontic, and would be in touch with 
its ontic situation, and which would open up genuinely emancipatory, non-democratic 
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possibilities from within its current situation. So one which would refuse the 
alternative of either a passive awaiting of the new or a violent attempt simply to bring 
it about. Rather it would be an attempt to attack the fragility of the current system at 
its ‘symptomatic moment’ and thus make room for the new. To attack the site at 
which an event which would revolutionise the current order might take place, without 
precipitating the event itself.
The question is that of the act and of a politics that would be ontic but would 
open up space for an ontological event, which is to say a radical turning in Western 
history, which is of course tied up with the democracy to which Žižek seeks an 
alternative. My worry is that this still seems to distinguish between the opening up of 
space for the event and the event itself, as if that would be an ontological politics, 
one which actually brought the event into reality: is Žižek not still stuck within a 
deconstructionist’s opposition? In other words, there still comes the incalculable 
moment of madness or decision or the moment after the preparation’s end in which 
mere awaiting is all that is left. And here we are back at precisely Heidegger’s 
position. As we shall now establish. For Heidegger, the site for the event, which he 
calls a ‘clearing’, is precisely that which man is to foster and watch over, without 
presuming to have the power to bring about a new event in history.
Heidegger
Žižek criticises those who dismiss Heidegger’s thought for its supposed complicity 
with politics, since in this way they can miss those actualised elements of it which are 
actually positive, its good questions about the ‘basic tenets of modernity’, which 
include its notions of humanism, democracy and progress. They endorse Heidegger 
with an ‘ambiguous conditional’ (Conversations with Žižek:28), as if they want him 
stripped of his inconveniently strident (anti-democratic, illiberal) elements. But for 
Žižek these are what should be retained and indeed exacerbated, this is the best of 
Heidegger1, but it is ‘still not radical enough’.
Heidegger without Nazism, or Heidegger understood later to renounce all 
politics, including Nazism, in his later work, reduces him to a mere humanitarian: in 
other words, to Hannah Arendt, whom Žižek identifies as the first ‘liberal 
Heideggerian’ (19, italicised). Elsewhere, Žižek has identified one of the three 
dogmas of contemporary thought as ‘everything Hannah Arendt says is right’! 
Somewhat akin to Derrida’s Of Spirit, which does not allow itself the simple 
condemnation of Nazism as if with a clean conscience, as if an opposition would not 
operate on the same terrain or in the same terms as that which it opposed, Žižek 
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implies that if one accepts the Heideggerian critique of humanism (or the human, 
perhaps the individual atomistic subject as subject of ‘human rights’) one cannot 
simply repudiate Nazism on humanitarian grounds, and thus oppose it abstractly in 
this way. And to oppose it on democratic grounds would miss the point too, which is 
precisely to find an alternative to technological democracy. In many ways, one might 
read Žižek’s whole piece as an attempt to find the correct way in which to determine 
where Nazism went wrong. And when one is attempting, as Heidegger was, to find 
an alternative to humanism (in the metaphysical sense) and democracy, this is not at 
all easy. Indeed, by 1969, it is clear that even Heidegger himself, among the greatest 
thinkers of the twentieth century, still had not found another way out. This struggle to 
exit in his wake might be said to characterise the entire trajectory of Žižek’s thought.
For Žižek, the failure of Nazism as an application of Heideggerianism does indeed 
mean that one should renounce ‘ontological politics’, which is to say one that would 
be adequate to the current sending of being, and thus one that would be able to bring 
about by sheer force of will a new sending, a new relation between man and the 
whole of beings. Staging an ‘encounter between global technology and modern 
humanity’ was what constituted the ‘inner truth and greatness’ of Nazism for 
Heidegger which is to say its ontological import (cf. Introduction to 
Metaphysics:213/152). This would be grand politics, capable of changing the face of 
the globe, the very way in which beings appeared to man, as technological energy-
resource.
Žižek’s politics
Žižek believes his own vision of politics to remain true to one element of Heidegger’s 
thought of which — here at least — he believes Heidegger to have fallen short. It 
follows from Žižek’s own elaboration of the ontological difference which here he 
believes eludes Heidegger, but which elsewhere Žižek himself attributes to 
Heidegger. First let us determine the nature of this politics, and then the nature of 
Žižek’s understanding of the ontological difference.
Žižek see politics as spanning the ontico-ontological divide, by acting among 
beings in a way that opens up space for a radically new revelation of the same, an 
event in being-history, a new event of being. Later Žižek speaks of a ‘trauma’ as an 
ontic occurrence which necessitates an entirely new understanding of the whole of 
beings, a new set of ‘ontological coordinates’ (23). It is as if ontic politics would seek 
out the trauma, the real which the current system has disavowed in order to 
constitute itself, which is nevertheless present in the ‘symptom’, the return (to 
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consciousness) of the repressed. Elsewhere he speaks of this politics as attacking 
the current system precisely at the place of its ‘symptomal knot’.
We have struggled in the past to define just what kind of politics Žižek wants 
in the Ticklish Subject (Heidegger Beyond Deconstruction:105–27), and it seems to 
us that here Žižek is more clear. It is one that prises and holds open a space for the 
new. This was already signalled at the end of For They Know Not What They Do: 
here the leftist project was defined as looking out for signs of the new, and always 
with respect to missed encounters, failures, lost causes, whose revolutionary 
potential must be revivified in the name of the future (For They Know Not What They 
Do:272–3). But crucially, this politics is not ‘ontological’ in attempting to itself bring 
about the new. It merely makes clear the incompleteness or inconsistency of the 
current regime and thus destroys its ideological appearance of necessity and 
ahistoricality. Thus it opens up a history once again and the possibility of the future.
Politics is ontic, but it has the grand ambition of preparing for an ontological 
event, a fundamental alteration in the way in which the whole is viewed, the way in 
which it appears to us, the very scope of the possibilities belonging to contemporary 
existence. It must focus on the void in the whole, the clearing as the place in which it 
might be possible for an alternative to present itself, since it is here that the 
inconsistency of the current regime cryptically reveals itself. ‘The true courage of an 
act is always the courage to accept the in-existence of the big Other, i.e. to attack the 
existing order at the point of its symptomal knot’ (40). This attempt to open up, to 
reveal to view the contingent suturing of a symbolic world is contingent upon a 
recognition of the ontological difference as merely a void in beings as a whole, the 
‘inexistence of the big Other’, and since Heidegger lacked the former courage we 
may attribute this ultimately perhaps to the perceived theoretical deficiency of his 
understanding of the ontological difference. An act attacks order at the place of its 
symptom, the void wherein its incompleteness appears or ‘is’. 
But this symptomal place of the void in the current order is precisely the place 
of the thing, which is precisely the ‘topic’ of Heidegger’s later work, which was 
indeed, in quite a strict sense, the ‘topology of being’ (Poetry, Language, 
Thought:12/84), the study of entities for which only the nodes are important and the 
rest of the structure can bend and move, as in Lacan’s knots (Delanda 2002:25–6).
Is there not something stereotypical about Žižek’s reading of ‘Green Gelassenheit’ 
here,2 as a mere passivity? Heidegger is quite clear that it is a preparation, and that 
the thinking which it involves is a form of acting. And we believe this preparation to 
be precisely the opening up of sites for such an entity as ‘the thing’. Things, by their 
distinctive setting up of a certain space around them, and their remaining finite and 
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hence always promising a new void, give us hope of a new world. This thing is 
precisely what Žižek means by the trauma, which politics is to attempt to bring to the 
fore by pointing up the truth of the symptom, thus demonstrating the fragile keystone 
of the current political-symbolic edifice. Žižek believes this kind of politics to be both 
licensed by his own radicalisation of the most basic sense of Heidegger’s ontological 
difference.3
Žižek’s radicalisation of the ontological difference
Not for the first time as we shall see, Žižek identifies the ontological difference as the 
difference between the entity and the void or nothing. It is the nothing that is not a 
thing which limits the totalisation of beings as such: that there is something other 
than beings within beings means that the latter cannot form a totality. Beings as such 
cannot form a whole because there is something which limits them, that is not a 
being: ‘ontological difference means that the field of reality is finite’ (21). Originally at 
least, when Heidegger remained close to Kant  — and this is the position in which 
Žižek here confines him, for the sake of criticism —, this non-wholeness is a non-
wholeness of the phenomenal, since it is grounded in the finite perspective of human 
beings, whose situatedness makes it impossible for them to perceive the entirety of 
beings or any one beings, imposing as it does the necessity of a horizonal vision of 
the whole. Nevertheless, in itself, noumenally, insofar as we think it rather than 
experience or understand it, the whole of beings is still complete, and can be intuited 
so by an infinite, creative or originary instinct that would belong to god.
This is why Žižek criticises Kant from a Hegelian point of view and has always 
done so, but here he also rebukes Heidegger with it. As if the non-totality of beings 
were just something that appeared to human beings. But this is precisely the illusion 
under which metaphysics laboured for Heidegger, that there were a god’s eye view, a 
view sub species aeternitatis, from which one could see beings as a whole, it is a 
perspective of ‘original infinitude’ from which human perception is viewed as fallen.
Elsewhere, Žižek is prepared to attribute his own radicalised understanding of the 
ontological difference is indeed Heidegger’s own. And yet, perhaps strategically, he 
is not prepared to do this in the current essay. With regard to the “draft” of the 
withdrawal of Being which attracts us by its withdrawal, Žižek aligns his own 
Lacanian terms directly with Heidegger’s: ‘In Lacanian terms, this “draft” of the 
withdrawal is the gap in the big Other’ (On Belief:108).4 And later, albeit in a more 
indirect fashion, he connects Heidegger’s notion of being as clearing and event with 
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some notion of the void: ‘he gave occasional hints as to how his notions of Clearing 
and Event resonate with the Oriental notion of the primordial Void’ (On Belief:11).
But Žižek is at his most explicit in The Parallax View, where he states quite 
clearly that the ontological difference does not name a difference between beings 
and something transcendent to them but remarks the incompleteness of beings as a 
whole, as well as the absence of anything exceeding this ‘whole’ (The Parallax 
View:23–4, cf. 38): ‘Ontological difference is not between the Whole of beings and 
their Outside, as if there were a Super-Ground of the All. In this precise sense, 
ontological difference is linked to finitude [...] which means that Being is the horizon 
of finitude which prevents us from conceiving beings in their All. Being cuts from 
within beings: ontological difference is not the “mega-difference” between the All of 
beings and something more fundamental, it is always also that which makes the 
domain of beings itself “non-all”’ (The Parallax View:24). Despite the creeping 
Kantianism of the phrase ‘which prevents us from conceiving beings’, the tendency of 
Žižek’s statement is to render Heidegger a Žižekian-Hegelian when it comes to the 
ontological difference: in other words, he aligns his own understanding of the 
ontological difference absolutely with Heidegger’s own. And indeed we believe, 
although it would take too long a reading to show it here, that this is precisely the way 
in which later Heidegger is to be understood. But this is the later Heidegger, not the 
middle, and this will have consequences for how the later Heidegger’s conception of 
action is to be understood.
It is this non-all which Žižek identifies as the two-faced ‘real’ of (late) Lacanian 
thought, one which gives the impression that there is a substantial real beyond the 
whole, but which is really just the non-totality of the appearance of anything, which 
gives the impression that the thing exists fully in itself independently of these 
perspectives on it — the curtain that creates the impression of something beyond it, 
as Hegel writes in ‘Force and the Understanding’, and which Lacan takes up as an 
image of his notion of fantasy. Thus the real is something that is a consequence of 
perspective, and Žižek compares it with the shift between perspectives, the parallax, 
since it is only here that perspectivality itself is revealed. The real is the singularity of 
any one perspective. Or rather, Žižek states that the real is to be understood as that 
which makes any vision ‘anamorphotically distorted’, the anamorphosis being an 
element of a view which is visible only from a certain perspective, as with the skull in 
Holbein’s Ambassadors. (In other words, the real is not a consequence of 
perspective, it is what causes there to be perspective.)
Since it is not itself substantial, it may be defined as that which differentiates 
one perspective from another, or as Žižek says, it is the gap between perspectives 
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(23).5The real then is the non-totality of appearance itself, the fact that it structurally 
cannot be viewed from no position at all, but can only be seen perspectivally (cf. The 
Puppet and the Dwarf:77).6 It is this non-totality, the real as non-totality that is being. 
And yet, while we have seen Žižek attribute this understanding to Heidegger himself, 
in the current essay he refuses to: ‘It seems that Heidegger was not ready to draw all 
the consequences’ (23). Heidegger would not be able to exceed the Kantian position, 
where this finitude is only a matter for us.
Now, it seems that this refusal on Žižek’s part allows him to distinguish his own 
political position from Heidegger’s: ‘This limitation of Heidegger has a series of 
philosophical and ethico-political consequences’ (23). Chief among these is that, for 
Heidegger, historical destiny exists on another level to ontic occurrences, and 
nothing ontic, nothing that we as human beings do can affect the course of being’s 
inexorable unfolding, its Gestalt-shifts, its turns, the sudden revelation of beings as a 
whole in a new way. In a revealing example Žižek states that this is why Heidegger 
cannot recognise the Shoah as unique, this event which shatters the ontological 
coordinates of its time, as a trauma does (23). This is to say that it cannot be made 
intelligible within the current scheme of things, it is not possible from the point of view 
of the present and itself shifts the limit of what counts as ‘possible’. It thus 
necessitates a new scheme of intelligibility, a new way of thinking.7
If something can happen that the current totality of beings does not contain 
even in potential, then this indicates that the current totality is in fact not total. Thus 
the trauma opens up a space which the contemporary horizon cannot encompass 
with understanding, and it thus opens up the possibility of a new order. Žižek seems 
to understand this trauma, perhaps the precipitation of the trauma, as an act, which is 
to say something carried out by man, as the holocaust undoubtedly was: it is not 
something that being makes possible but something that man does which is 
impossible, an extreme act, much like the revolutionary anti-democratic act which 
Žižek desires. Again, it is perhaps because the Nazis had the courage to attempt 
something new that they could execute such an impossible act as the extermination, 
For Žižek however it is not this which distinguishes between the false event of 
Nazism and the true event of Stalinism. He often points out that the Stalinist purges 
were the more terrifying for their randomness and unpredictability (cf. Did Somebody 
Say Totalitarianism?:68). Indeed, elsewhere Žižek has indicated, after Agamben, the 
danger of absolutising the Shoah, as an unnameable event which somehow exceeds 
any form of logic. For Žižek this prevents one from specifying how it is indeed part of 
a logic and was the result of a certain history and so on. 
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But once again this is very close to Heidegger’s vision of the holocaust, one 
which for all its faults, at least honestly admitted that in truth the holocaust itself 
changed nothing. Heidegger’s point with respect to Nazism is perhaps precisely that 
to believe in this uniqueness is to adopt Nazism’s own understanding of itself, which 
is that it had by force of will brought something entirely new into the course of history, 
but in fact it was merely another, albeit extreme, manifestation of a nihilistic destiny 
which exceeded it. And yet here Žižek does imply that for him the holocaust was 
unique, which constitutes another example of Žižek’s slightly moderating his earlier 
avowals of proximity to Heidegger). This is why Heidegger could say two world wars 
changed nothing, when it came to what is ontological and historical, it brought about 
and was nothing like a new event in history. If Nazism is not a true event, is Žižek 
licensed in saying that the holocaust was, that the holocaust was truly novel and 
unique, and something like a negative absolute, compared with which, nothing is so 
bad?
At another level, one can see why Žižek alters his position here, for the fact 
that (he and) Heidegger have said this with regard to the holocaust could be seen as 
another way of denying the possibility of such a thing as an act, a truly novel act 
brought about by human will alone, a miracle that produces something new. And that 
is precisely what Žižek is arguing for here, and arguing that it is something in which 
Heidegger does not believe. (Although again, the Nazi event was not such an act, it 
just — rightly, for Žižek — believed in the act’s possibility.) For Žižek, because 
Heidegger does not recognise being as immanent to beings, as a void therein, he 
cannot think that historical destiny can be influenced by us, or that an ontic 
Geschehnis can have ontological historical effects, which is ultimately what Žižek 
wants: to salvage the possibility of a revolution initiated by human beings, the ‘act’. 
This is what Heidegger is supposed to have shied away from, because he had 
believed that Nazism was such a politics which could bring about or indeed was an 
ontological event, and that had issued not only in disaster but in a retention of the 
status quo, onto-historically.
However, contra Žižek, we do not believe that Heidegger made such a 
withdrawal. Or at least, we believe that if Heidegger did withdraw from politics, he did 
not withdraw from the possibility of human action. Heidegger does believe in ontic 
acts having effects which might properly be called ontological. These take the form of 
our preparation, hope, fostering, ‘shepherding’ those singular beings known as 
things, in order that a place might be found within beings for a revelation — by 
contrast — of the truth of the contemporary configuration of beings. The thing would 
be the ‘placeholder’ of the void.8 
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That the historical nature of being’s revelation is revealed here gives us hope, 
hope for new — a new turning in being’s heart, whereby a new side of beings would 
be shown to us —, for the emancipatory new with respect to technology, a freedom 
to take or leave it: Ge-lassen, both a gathering and a leaving, an attitude to 
technology which acknowledges its non-independent nature, its dependence upon a 
revelation of beings that is itself finite, as should be acknowledged and as is 
becoming apparent today with the impending end of fossil fuels and the 
environmental change — not to say, devastation — that their incineration has 
brought with it.
Being for Heidegger would be nothing besides the singularity of the dying, 
finite thing, which is to say immanent to them, as the void of their finitude, a finitude 
not based on the subject’s finite positioning within them, such that they always have 
a non-apparent side held back. The thing would be the shrine of the nothing (The 
Thing:179/171), the. gravestone marking its place, marking place of the dead-absent 
within the living-present, which acts as a memorial amidst today’s oblivion to being. 
And human action would foster such things, worship these voids. And does not Žižek 
himself describes the Lacano-Freudian ‘thing’ as a ‘tombstone’ (For They Know Not 
What They Do:272), the ‘lost cause’ of the Left?
The lost potential of the past, for the future
The formally satisfying structure of Žižek’s essay means that in the end he returns to 
the tale with which he began: Chesterton’s tale of concealing one corpse, one 
dummy, one mort, one symptomatic moment, by condemning the entirety of a 
system: condemning one episode along with the rest of a thinker’s thought taken to 
be of a piece with it. Žižek’s point is that psychoanalysis has taught us to expect a 
qualitative distinction immanent to the field of conscious knowledge, the moment 
which we disavow as that in which truth appears, the truth of one’s desire, the truth of 
one’s singularity. All the while, Žižek has referred to Heidegger’s singularity, his 
radicality, his uniqueness, being blunted by either democratic critics or 
reinterpretations. Heidegger also saw that despite being individualistic, contemporary 
democracy was the enemy of singularity.
Žižek attempts not to untie the knot of the symptomatic moment of 
Heidegger’s Nazism but to scrutinise it ever more thoroughly. He has indeed over 
several books been fixated by this ‘deadlock’. And for him it illuminates back and 
forth the whole of Heidegger’s oeuvre with a different light, the light of the subject 
peeping through a discourse which otherwise appears to deconstruct any such thing.
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(I must confess that in an earlier work (2005) I myself have attempted to be un-
Žižekian and to demonstrate that Heidegger’s later thought is so different from his 
early work that the elements of the early work which tended towards the Nazi 
engagement cannot contaminate the later work, which is itself however not at all 
apolitical. And indeed, at the same time, I still have doubts about Žižek’s naming of 
the symptomatic moment of the whole ‘subject’, ‘the truly problematic and central 
point’, as Žižek himself recognises.9 I do not believe a revolution can now be stirred 
by any form of human suffering or exploitation, only the exploitation of nature and its 
‘suffering’, the ‘environment’ as the master-signifier of a new political discourse and 
movement.)
Heidegger was ‘almost right’, and with his ‘decisionist’ attempt to wilfully 
change the course of being’s history, to bring being out of its abeyance by means of 
a political gesture (if indeed he had such grander ambitions beyond the university, 
which is — for him — nevertheless central to the spiritual life of a nation), he 
discovered the structure of the revolutionary act, in the sense that he believed here in 
a livable political project that was not democratic, the third of the three options with 
which we and Žižek began. Although Žižek does not quite say it, what is problematic 
for him, and what is perhaps the reason why Heidegger could in Foucauldian fashion 
fall for Nazism rather than Stalinism, is the notion that politics can bring about 
ontological change, world-historical change, a change in destiny (a prevalent word for 
Heidegger at the time). For Žižek this would be ‘ontological politics’, while, in a way 
that avoids both this and the ‘ontic politics’ of pragmatic compromise which 
characterises the deconstructive tradition and which allows one to produce (contra 
Laclau, for instance) a non-democratic theory which nevertheless takes into account 
deconstructive insights, Žižek is seeking a politics which can open up the space for 
ontological change without willing it or believing it can bring it about.
This is necessary in order to allow the future to present itself as New. If one 
moulds the future after one’s own image, if one expects anything, the future will not 
really be the future, so one can in no way will the future or bring it about by force, one 
can only make room for it. If one attempts to mould the future, one closes out the 
other. If, on the other hand, one partakes of an ontic politics that opens up space for 
the new, one allows the event to come. Again, does this not seem reminiscent of the 
later Heidegger’s position, in which one cannot bring about a turn in the unwinding of 
destiny by will alone? Here, man does not have the power to do such a thing, but one 
can prepare for such an eventuality, make it possible. In this context, Derrida speaks 
of this as making the impossible possible, the impossible, which cannot be 
conditioned by the present. One can only prepare for a turn in being’s history. In any 
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case, for Žižek, Heidegger was right with regard to the form of revolutionary action, 
but gave it fascist content. But was he, by Žižek’s own lights, if the ontological form of 
politics is not acceptable? In what sense did Heidegger get it right save in his 
opposition to democracy? Žižek seems to want more. Perhaps his notion that 
humans can affect something with respect to the ontological.10 ‘Our task thus is to 
repeat Heidegger and retrieve this lost dimension or potential of his thought’ (31). For 
Žižek, this lost potential is a far Leftist form of revolution. He consistently states that 
Heidegger had no time for communism. But let us examine Heidegger’s thoughts on 
communism.
Heidegger’s communism
After his Nazi engagement, particularly in the gigantic and tortured works of the 
1930’s when an entirely new relationship with language was being wrought through a 
violent struggle with his mother tongue, was Heidegger’s relation to communism so 
simple? In fact, there are many passages where Heidegger refers to communism in a 
way that is more sympathetic than his consistently scathing remarks on capitalism (or 
‘Americanism’). Something deeply symptomatic of the age speaks from out of 
communism, and it knows it: “No matter which of the various positions one chooses 
to adopt toward the doctrines of communism and to their foundation, from the point of 
view of the history of being it is certain that an elemental experience of what is world-
historical speaks out in it. Whoever takes “communism” only as a “party” or a 
“Weltanschauung” is thinking too shallowly, just as those who by the term 
“Americanism” mean, and mean derogatorily, nothing more than a particular lifestyle’ 
(‘Letter on Humanism’:258–60). Communism is more than a mere politics: the 
essence of communism is ‘neither “political” nor “sociological”, neither 
“weltanschaulich” nor “anthropological”’, but rather a conceptual grasping of ‘the 
jointure [Fügung] of beings as such as a whole’ (Geschichte des Seyns:191).11
It may equally reveal the world as power and energy —‘[T]he word of Lenin: 
Bolshevism is Soviet power + electrification. That means Bolshevism is the “organic”, 
i.e., organised, calculating (and as +) conclusion of the unconditional power of the 
party along with complete technologisation’ (Parmenides:86/127) — but it does so 
more explicitly than capitalism, by distributing this power across all human beings, 
thereby bringing its humanocentrism and Gestell-like relation with the real to light. In 
many ways it is the absolutely extreme form of this, where the distribution of power, 
by becoming equally shared, sinks into inapparence. In this way it is perhaps more 
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symptomatic of its age than capitalism, while retaining the self-same understanding 
of the earth.
In a way, despite Žižek’s statement that Heidegger does not recognise the 
communist revolution as an event, is he not doing just that when he says that it 
brings the truth of the age to the fore: does it not thereby partake (knowingly?) in the 
event of the age, which is to reveal the world as energy and power, to set upon it as 
resource? Heidegger’s fascinating analysis of power and communism in Geschichte 
des Seyns expresses the twofold nature of Heidegger’s stance towards communism 
and capitalism: on the one hand he stresses the essential sameness of these 
apparently opposed state-forms, and on the other he privileges communism as a 
more self-aware form of politics. 
All state-forms today would be alike in considering political affairs in terms of 
power, just as a pre-revolutionary bourgeois politics does for Marx. The difference 
between these forms is merely one of revelation: one does not see that one is 
dominated by power in democratic regimes, whereas it becomes quite blatant in a 
dictatorship (Geschichte des Seyns:189). For Heidegger this means that all politics 
would remain indifferent and would not question or truly respond to the event of 
manifestation characteristic of its time, in which being is revealed as power: ‘Power 
[Macht] is thus the name for the being of beings’ (Geschichte des Seyns:182). 
Heidegger goes on to say that power becomes unconditional not in its uninhibited 
exercise by a dictator, but when it is shared among all in communism, when its 
ubiquity renders it tacit, invisible: ‘The empowering of power [Ermächtigung der 
Macht] in the unconditionedness of machination, and from out of this is the essence 
of “communism”’ (Geschichte des Seyns:191).12 
Is this the kind of event which Žižek sees in the October revolution? For 
Žižek, despite the way in which things ultimately actualised themselves, the potential 
of a genuine alternative to democracy (and fascism) was opened up here, making 
this a true event, an event of the truly new. This Heidegger perhaps does not admit, 
seeing communism as merely the generalisation of what exists already in capitalism, 
and a revelation of the ontological state of affairs already in existence. But this for 
Heidegger is a necessary precondition for the eventual manifestation of the new. It is 




Žižek, seemingly more and more attracted by Walter Benjamin, follows his 
interpretation to the effect that the October revolution repeats the French revolution 
and redeems its failure, the potentials that failed to be actualised in the actual 
unfolding of the event. Naturally this is not a question of a fate which pre-existed 
events, for the angel of history stands on the threshold of the present looking 
backwards, which is how one reads history, in itself a retrospective recounting of 
events, the ordering of a narrative which can be seen as tending towards a messianic 
moment of judgement or revelation, some sort of end to history, whether achievable 
or not.
“The New can ONLY emerge through repetition”. (31) On the other hand, this 
insight is not new, for sixteen years earlier Žižek wrote this: 
the compulsion to encircle again and again the site of the lost Thing, to mark 
it in its very impossibility — as exemplified by the embodiment of the drive in 
its zero degree, in its most elementary, the tombstone which just marks the 
site of the dead.
This, then, is the point where the Left must not ‘give way’: it must 
preserve the traces of all historical traumas, dreams and catastrophes which 
the ruling ideology of the ‘End of History’ would prefer to obliterate [...]. Such 
an attitude, far from confining the Left within a nostalgic infatuation with the 
past, is the only possibility for attaining a distance on the present, a distance 
which will enable us to discern signs of the New. (For They Know Not What 
They Do:272–3)
The virtual is betrayed by its particular actualisation, for which Žižek rehabilitates his 
Lacanian phrase, ‘in x more than x’, a description of the object petit a, that in you 
which I love, which is nonetheless beyond you. Žižek presents a fascinating reading 
of the early Heidegger’s notion of time and repetition along these lines, whereby the 
genuine future is contained in the past as ‘hidden, non-realised potentials’, and the 
authentic future is a retrieval of this past (32).
It is thanks to this combination of Deleuzian virtuality and Benjaminian 
redemption that Žižek can now alter the position he took in The Ticklish Subject and 
retrieve the emancipative potential of ‘actually existing’ fascism, the genuine ‘inner 
greatness’ which Heidegger noted. This is what allows him to re-invoke the 
distinction between form and content which he might formerly have been more 
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cautious about, as befits a Hegelian. A deep past that has never been part of present 
experience and so remains always in the future, as something entirely other, entirely 
unconscious to the present, is a trauma, something that entered us in the night 
without our registering, but whose after-effects are shaking us and silently guiding 
our behaviour. The futurality of the trauma for Žižek consists in the fact that this event 
from the past can erupt13 and itself destroy the present symbolic order, thus making 
room for something new, without — we are compelled to presume — bringing about 
this new order, just erupting as a formation of the unconscious, becoming manifest 
as a symptom of the current arrangement of consciousness and calling for (and so 
making possible) something new.
The imposition of a new order following the traumatic eruption is explicitly 
identified by Žižek, albeit in an anti-Heideggerian context, as a new event of being, a 
new ‘ontological disclosure’: ‘what Heidegger misses is the suspension of the 
dimension of the (being-in-the-)world [...] as the most radical dimension of 
subjectivity, as that against which the violent synthetic imposition of a (New) Order — 
the Event of Historical Disclosure of Being — is the defence’ (The Ticklish 
Subject:50).
For Žižek, Heidegger has no notion of such a thing, a subjective act that 
would create a void, a hole in the current symbolic explanation, a rent that can only 
ever be patched up but never eradicated altogether. He defines trauma as occurring 
when ‘an ontic intrusion gets so excessively powerful that it shatters the very 
ontological horizon’ (36). Identifying the holocaust as such a trauma, Žižek shows 
how it is the intrusion of a void into the current order that demands a new order, an 
entirely new epoch in the revelation of the whole. Traumatic returns lead to a ‘loss of 
reality’, which is to say that the symptom shows that the symbolic order one had used 
to bind reality together in truth hangs together by a merest thread and does not finally 
make sense. Hence the ‘loss of ontological horizon’.14
For Žižek — and here he seems to be consistent with his earlier exposition in 
The Ticklish Subject — what is at work here is an ahistorical subject, a drive that 
aims to destroy and thus make room for a rebuilding of any symbolic construction, a 
counter-natural drive that ‘cannot be reduced to an epoch of being’, ‘modern 
subjectivity bent on technological domination’ (37). This is the ‘non-metaphysical core 
of modern subjectivity itself’ (34) which Žižek has always considered Heidegger to 
have overlooked.
There is an ahistorical core in Heidegger’s notion of the history of being, and 
it is precisely Ereignis itself, the event is ahistorical, as — once again — Žižek 
elsewhere acknowledges: ‘each epochal experience of the truth of Being is a failure, 
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a defeat of thought’s endeavour to capture the Thing. Heidegger himself — at least in 
his great moments — never fell into this’ (For They Know Not What They Do:137n2). 
The difference which Žižek and ourselves formerly insisted upon, that the point of 
disagreement was in naming this ahistorical moment ‘the subject’ has to some extent 
been ameliorated if we accept that Heidegger’s understanding of human action, in his 
later works, is closer to Žižek’s own understanding of revolutionary action than he 
believes.
Conclusion: to oppose democracy without communism?
To summarise then, Žižek has elsewhere broached something like the interpretation 
of later Heidegger that we have here attempted to present, and yet here, he refuses 
it. On this reading, Heidegger does allow room for ontic political action, in the form of 
the attitude towards the thing as placeholder of the void in the current order, which 
fosters it as a symptomatic moment of the truth of beings as a whole. But this reading 
can perhaps only be made of the later Heidegger, not the more militant middle order. 
And indeed the former Žižekian Heidegger in fact issues from the failure of Nazism. 
The problem with the middle period, as Žižek recognises, is its attempt to control 
being’s destiny by human will, while the later Heidegger — and Žižek himself — 
acknowledges that all humans can do is prepare a site for the event, by making a 
clearing within beings. 
What then does Žižek glean from Heidegger’s middle period which he could 
not derive from the later? It seems to us now that it is only the wilfulness of the 
human act and its violent language of attack, its overtly ‘revolutionary’ attitude. But 
this seems to us to be unnecessarily humanistic in locating the symptomal point of 
the current world in something which concerns communism, and that is human 
suffering and exploitation. What if the symptomatic point of the current configuration 
of beings were not the human exploitation enjoined by capitalism but the natural 
exploitation enjoined by technology under the sway of ‘systematic en-framing’ 
(Gestell)? The symptomatic moment is that characteristic of the contemporary order 
which captures its most fundamental essence, the destruction of which would 
constitute a revolutionary alteration of this order. In this case, the point at which ontic, 
revolutionary action should be directed, in order to open up the space for a new 
revelation of beings (a new event or Ereignis), might rather be here. This we believe 
to be Heidegger’s later view.
Man’s only task is to keep in mind the fragile things of nature and to their 
finitude, the deathliness which technology attempts to close out in favour of constant 
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presence, its realisation of the Western understanding of being in practical form. 
Once man has done this, it is then in nature’s power, or perhaps god’s, to reveal 
something new to us (not man but ‘only a god can save us now’). We just have to 
remain open to  the possibility of this revelation, while constantly preparing sites for it. 
The question is perhaps whether there is any politics that could do this, or whether 
such an action would not rather be ethical? 
This is why we might point to nature as the source of the revolt rather than 
humanity: nature still retains its otherness and as it loses this otherness in being 
transformed into technology’s resource, it cries out for this. Full technologisation of 
production would free the worker from toil but would not remove capitalism. The 
source of value and that upon which the system depends would merely have shifted, 
and nature would now be the one exploited for its value. If communism itself has an 
exploitative attitude to nature just as much as Nazism and capitalism, does this not 
suggest that there is not the potential for a genuine alternative to the most radical 
essence of the present age even in communism?
 Thus Heidegger closes down more options than Žižek and thereby sets 
himself a still more difficult task.15 He refuses both of capitalism and communism on 
the grounds on their humanism and historical situatedness, their shared exploitative 
relation to nature. And this is why he is perhaps reluctant to repudiate Nazism 
absolutely because he is worried that this will indeed leave him with no options at all.
It is this that relieves him of Žižek’s somewhat ‘convenient’ exit route from democracy 
in terms of communism, a potential which already existed. Heidegger’s task is yet 
more challenging: how to oppose democracy without the possibility of communism. 
Not Nazism, not capitalism, not communism: is any politics appropriate for 
Heidegger, appropriate in the sense of operating on the level of being-history and 
destiny? Can it in any way aid in the preparatory, meditative, action which Heidegger 
deems necessary on the part of man in the hoped-for appearance of the thing? Is 
Heidegger perhaps trying to think an alternative to democracy which does not 
already exist, even in potential, an attempt which cannot simply delve into the 
potential of the past and retrieve the New as a different actualisation of a past 
potential? Heidegger certainly attempts to think another form of action to the 
contemporary busyness of praxis, one which attempts to bring about the new by 
watching over the thing as the site of the futural event. 
But is it possible to have a politics of the thing? Is it in politics that the New 
can be prepared for? Are we to explain Žižek’s unexplained refusal of an 
interpretation of Heidegger which he had previously provided as allowing him this 
presupposition, that it is in politics that the event must be prepared for? Does his own 
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earlier interpretation of the later Heidegger not suggest rather that revolutionary 
action is rather a task for ethics, or perhaps neither of these, certainly not in their 
traditional acceptation. Of course, Žižek’s whole point has long been to oppose the 
deconstructionist view of politics, but that does not mean that the latter is not in some 
fundamental way correct. The question is whether a revolution that did not take place 
at the level of politics would be extensive enough to prevent the ever mounting 
devastation of the earth from reaching its consummation.
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1 The purpose of Žižek’s invocation of Emmanuel Faye’s discovery of Heidegger’s philosophical 
grounding of Nazism in his seminars on the State from 1933–5 is perhaps invoked by Žižek to 
undercut those whom he has just railed against, who do not read Heidegger because his thought is 
taken to support Nazism. That is precisely why this thought and these seminars in particular are 
interesting, because Žižek is interested in just that, the practical actualisation of theory.
2 Why the apparent mockery? Elsewhere Žižek has agreed with us that the environment question is 
unquestionably the most important and pressing of our time.
3 But in this way it would be the outcome of a thinking that stood at the ‘end of metaphysics’. Would 
Žižek be happy to situate himself here? To be considered part of that ‘community of the question’ 
which meditates on the possibility of thought at the end of philosophy? (Writing and Difference:98) 
If he aligns himself within the tradition which thinks the ontological difference, does he have any 
choice in the matter?
4 Žižek is referring to Heidegger’s celebration of Socrates as the ‘purest thinker of the West’ who 
stood fast in the draft where all who came after him would flee, the one who dared to write nothing. 
It is curious that Žižek should understand Heidegger to be saying that a human being (a ‘subject’?) 
acts as the place-holder for this void: ‘Socrates was the only one who endured in this gap, who 
acted as a stand-in and place-holder, who, for his interlocutors, gave body, occupied the space of 
this gap. All subsequent philosophers concealed this gap by providing a closed ontological edifice. 
[...] It is crucial here that Heidegger defines Socrates in purely structural terms: what matters is the 
structural place (of the inconsistency of the Other) he occupies, in which he persists, not the 
positive content of his teaching [...] ‘Socrates’ names just a certain POSITION [sic] of enunciation’ 
(B:108–9). But then again, one almost finds these exact words in Heidegger’s 1969 Seminar in Le 
Thor: ‘Being, however, for its opening, needs man as the there of its manifestation. [/] [...] The 
human is the place-holder [Platzhalter] of the nothing’ (Four Seminars:63/108). We have argued 
elsewhere that man is this place-holder, he has this access to nothingness as such because of his 
peculiar relation to death as such.
5  Žižek uses something like this argument in Looking Awry to explain or excuse his ‘sinthomatic’ 
use of film examples, these peculiar interludes which make Žižek’s works both enjoyable and 
peculiar to him, as well as occasionally frustrating for us. This is why it is useless to complain that 
Žižek’s works should become less symptomatic and more academic, disciplined etc, for it ignores 
their performative-Lacanian aspect, which is to enact singularity.
6 It is here that Žižek for the first time draws close to a thinker he admits  to never having had much 
time for, contrary to almost every philosopher of the twentieth century, Nietzsche (Conversations 
with Žižek).
7 And indeed the Shoah-event has stirred just such an attempt to find a new way of thinking, 
beyond totality and identity, in post-war thought, beginning particularly with Levinas and Adorno.
8 ‘Socrates was the only one who endured in this gap, who acted as a stand-in and place-holder, 
who, for his interlocutors, gave body, occupied the space of this gap. All subsequent philosophers 
concealed this gap by providing a closed ontological edifice. [...] It is crucial here that Heidegger 
defines Socrates in purely structural terms: what matters is the structural place (of the 
inconsistency of the Other) he occupies, in which he persists, not the positive content of his 
teaching [...] ‘Socrates’ names just a certain POSITION [sic] of enunciation’ (On Belief:108–9). But 
then again, one almost finds these exact words in Heidegger’s 1969 Seminar in Le Thor: ‘Being, 
however, for its opening, needs man as the there of its manifestation. [/] [...] The human is the 
place-holder of the nothing’ (Four Seminars:63/108). For a more expansive exposition of my 
reading of Heidegger’s thing, see my Heidegger Beyond Deconstruction.
9  ‘Heidegger is fully aware that the “derangement of man’s position among beings” [A quotation 
from Contributions to Philosophy (237/338)], the fact that man’s emergence somehow “derails” the 
balance of entities, is in a way older than Truth itself, its very hidden foundation [...] for Heidegger, 
the Truth-Event can occur only within such a fundamental “ontological imbalance”. The truly 
problematic and central point is that Heidegger refuses to call this “ontological imbalance” or 
“derangement” subject’ (The Fragile Absolute:168n.58).
10 The following passage from The Ticklish Subject should give some clues here. Perhaps the title 
of the present essay is a deliberate modification of the earlier phrase ‘a step in the right direction’, 
for in a footnote to the title, Žižek adds ‘in the wrong direction’ (n.1): ‘what [the Habermasian] 
criticism rejects as proto-Fascist decisionism is simply the basic condition of the political. In a 
perverted way, Heidegger’s Nazi engagement was therefore a “step in the right direction”, a step 
towards openly admitting and fully assuming the consequences of the lack of ontological 
guarantee, of the abyss of human freedom’ (The Ticklish Subject:21).
11 In the same way, the theory of communism, Marx’s work, understands the contemporary 
situation in a particularly enlightened way, as Heidegger quite often acknowledged: ‘Because Marx 
by experiencing estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history 
is superior to that of other historical accounts’ (‘Letter on Humanism’:258). ‘Marxism is indeed the 
thought of today, where the self-production of man and society plainly prevails [herrscht]’ (Four 
Seminars:73/387).
12 De Beistegui (2007) has provided a fascinating reading of these passages.
13 Or rather, events become traumatic only after the fact, when a new symbolic arrangement is able 
to attribute to them a traumatic import — as Žižek would now say, the real reveals itself only when 
the (symbolising) perspective shifts.
14 Žižek suggests that we are left confronting the raw ontic thing, but this seems to regress to a pre-
parallax real outside of symbolic determinations which would betray it, a notion which Žižek has 
spent some time refuting. A purely ontic thing would be one that did not appear, that was a mere 
void, perhaps this is how we are to understand it: anxiety is a moment when beings swirl away, 
and we are left to stare into their retreat, helpless and abandoned, as Heidegger so brilliantly 
describes in ‘What is Metaphysics?’. Žižek himself recognises this elsewhere: ‘In the second part, 
however, the perspective is as it were reversed: the immersion in the life-world itself is not the 
original fact, but is conceived of as secondary with regard to the abyss of Dasein’s “thrown-ness” 
[...] which is experienced in the mode of anxiety [...] it is ultimately from this abyss that we escape 
into engaged immersion in the world’ (On Belief:106–7).
15 Heidegger says in his interview with Der Spiegel, ‘a decisive question for me today is: how can a 
political system accommodate itself to the technological age, and which political system would this 
be?’ (Der Spiegel:104/206) Heidegger continues: ‘I have no answer to this question. I am not 
convinced it is democracy’ (ibid.).
